Police K-9 warnings remain an important factor in use of force analysis, but they do not automatically make a deployment constitutional. In Harrold v. Hagen, the 4th Circuit examined whether using a police service dog against a hidden burglary suspect amounted to excessive force, despite multiple warnings before deploying the dog. The decision highlights how courts evaluate K-9 deployments under the totality of the circumstances, including threat level, resistance, containment, and officer perspective.
Harrold v. Hagen, 2026 WL 1145569 (4th Cir. 2026)
In Harrold v. Hagen, the court reiterated that warnings matter in police K-9 deployments — but they are not the whole constitutional analysis.
On the night after Christmas, Richard Harrold broke into an auto dealership in Chesterfield County, Virginia. (Maybe he wasn’t satisfied with what Santa brought him…?) When police arrived, Harrold fled upstairs and hid. A police service dog team searched the building. When the K-9 handler located the suspect in a storage room, he gave five verbal warnings, then deployed his dog. The dog delivered a , sustained bite, causing severe injuries to the sensitive parts between Harrold’s legs. The dog also chewed up Harrold’s prosthetic lower limb, leaving him with one less leg to stand on.
“Qualified immunity protects reasonable decisions made in uncertain, evolving situations — not perfect decisions judged after the fact.”
The trial court granted qualified immunity to the police service dog handler, but a divided appellate court disagreed on whether qualified immunity applied.
The Majority: Don’t Reduce the Case to “Was There a Warning?”
The trial court had focused heavily on warnings — specifically, whether the officer gave any before deploying the dog. Harrold had claimed no warnings were issued, but body-worn camera footage showed at least five warnings were given, leading to the courts decision to grant qualified immunity.
The appellate court, however, said that focusing on the warnings misses the point. The real question, the court said, is broader: Was the force itself — under the totality of the circumstances — unnecessary, gratuitous, or disproportionate?
The court reframed the clearly established right this way: A non-threatening, unarmed, and passively resisting suspect has a right to be free from excessive force, including a police service dog deployment that is unnecessary or disproportionate. And under the plaintiff’s version of the facts (which controls at this stage), the situation looked exactly like that. Harrold was unarmed, not actively resisting, was in a submissive, prone position, and was effectively contained.
If those facts are true, the court said, then deploying a police service dog to inflict a prolonged bite could violate clearly established law — even if warnings were given earlier.
That’s the key takeaway: Warnings are important — but they don’t automatically make force reasonable.
The Dissent: Specificity, Perspective, and Real-World Uncertainty
The dissent took a very different view — and it’s one worth paying attention to because it tracks closely with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. First, the dissent argues the majority defined the right too broadly — exactly what the Supreme Court warned against in Zorn v. Linton. General phrases like “non-threatening,” “passively resisting,” and “disproportionate force,” sound precise, but they don’t tell an officer what to do in a real encounter.
Second, the dissent argues warnings matter more than the majority admits. Officers here reportedly gave multiple warnings — including inside the building. That distinguishes this case from prior police service dog cases where no warning was given. Third (and maybe most importantly), the dissent insists on evaluating the case from the perspective of the officer at the time, not in hindsight. From that vantage point, the situation looked very different:
- The suspect had just committed a break-in.
- He fled and hid.
- His hands were not visible.
- Officers could not confirm whether he was armed.
Based on this analysis, the dissent says a reasonable officer could view the situation as dangerous — and use a police service dog to gain control. In short, the dissent’s message is that qualified immunity protects reasonable decisions made in uncertain, evolving situations — not perfect decisions judged after the fact.
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Practical Takeaways for Officers
This case is a good reminder that police service dog deployments live in a gray area that courts continue to refine.
- Give clear warnings whenever feasible. They still matter — a lot. In some cases, they’re decisive.
- But don’t rely on warnings alone. A warning does not “green-light” force. The force still has to fit the moment.
- Watch the suspect’s status at the time of deployment. Are they contained? Are they actively resisting? Do they pose an immediate threat? Force that might be justified seconds earlier can become excessive once the threat changes.
- Think in terms of control, not punishment. Once a suspect is effectively secured, continued force — especially something like a prolonged K-9 bite — becomes much harder to justify.
- Remember the perspective rule. Courts will (or should) evaluate what a reasonable officer could perceive at the time — not what turns out to be true later.
Harrold v. Hagen a critical point of debate in current use-of-force law. The majority says, “Don’t let warnings distract you from whether the force itself was justified.” The dissent says, “Don’t let hindsight and broad labels erase the reality officers face in uncertain, fast-moving situations.”
Both messages are worth remembering — because in the field, you don’t get to pick which lens a court will use later.
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