A cellphone search warrant does not automatically authorize investigators to search a replacement device using the same telephone number. In United States v. González-Arocho, the 1st Circuit ruled agents exceeded a warrant identifying a different phone by model and unique device numbers. Since agents understood the mismatch before the search, the good faith exception did not prevent suppression of the evidence.
United States v. González-Arocho, 2026 WL 1983490 (1st Cir. 2026)
Search warrants for electronic devices are becoming increasingly common, but this case is a good reminder that a warrant authorizes exactly what it says — and nothing more.
In Puerto Rico, as part of an investigation into the illegal transfer of child sex abuse material (CSAM), federal agents obtained a warrant to search an iPhone belonging to Miguel González-Arocho. The warrant described the device by its model (an iPhone 6s), color, serial number, IMEI number, and telephone number. When agents contacted González-Arocho, however, they quickly discovered he no longer possessed that phone. Instead, he had upgraded to an iPhone 13 that carried the same telephone number but had a different IMEI and serial number.
Rather than pausing to obtain a new warrant, the agents searched González-Arocho’s newer phone. Forensic analysis determined it contained over 100 files containing CSAM.
“When officers discover the property in front of them does not match the property described in the warrant, the safest — and constitutionally correct — course is to pause and obtain additional judicial authorization.”
Investigators reasoned that because the iPhone 13 was associated with the same phone number, it was effectively the same device. The 1st Circuit disagreed.
The three-judge panel emphasized the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement exists to limit government discretion. A warrant must describe with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized. When officers discover the property in front of them does not match the property described in the warrant, the safest — and constitutionally correct — course is to pause and obtain additional judicial authorization.
The government argued the search should nevertheless be upheld under the good faith exception because the agents believed they were searching the correct phone. The court rejected that argument. The agents recognized before conducting the search that the phone in their possession did not match the description in the warrant. They knew the model, IMEI number, and serial number were different, yet they made no meaningful effort to clarify the discrepancy with the issuing judge or obtain a revised or new warrant. Under those circumstances, their reliance on the original warrant was no longer objectively reasonable.
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The lesson for investigators: A search warrant defines both the scope of the search and the object of the search. If the warrant authorizes the search of one specific electronic device and officers discover a different device — even one associated with the same suspect or the same telephone number — they should stop and obtain a new warrant or an amendment unless another recognized exception to the warrant requirement clearly applies.
Digital evidence is often among the most valuable evidence in a criminal investigation. See my analysis of United States v. Johnson for another example. Taking the extra time to ensure the warrant accurately matches the device may prevent months or years of litigation — and may ultimately determine whether critical evidence is admitted or suppressed.
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