United States v. Schmitz, 2025 WL 2730804 (11th Cir. 2025)
Investigators had been watching Steven Schmitz for several months, surveilling his residence weekly and following him from time to time while gathering evidence he was selling illegal drugs. Authorities ultimately obtained a search warrant for the man’s home at 4279 Violet Circle, Lake Worth, Florida, describing the property in documents as “a single family residence.”
Five weeks before obtaining the search warrant, investigators searched the trash bin at 4279 Violet Circle and found marijuana residue along with mail addressed to Jose Rosana. On two occasions — four weeks and one week prior to executing the search warrant — investigators observed hand-to-hand sales of cocaine after Schmitz drove away from the property. The investigators also noticed Schmitz making evasive driving maneuvers as he left the Violet Circle address.
Two weeks after seeing the last hand-to-hand cocaine deal, investigators initiated a traffic stop on Schmitz. In his car, police found marijuana, a large amount of cash, and drug paraphernalia. Agent Carlos Valencia asked Schmitz if he lived at 4279 Violet Circle, but he denied residing there. Agent Valencia also seized some keys from Schmitz. He then wrote a warrant affidavit from his car while parked down the street from Violet Circle.
Once the search warrant was signed, officers went to 4279 Violet Circle. There, they learned Rosana owned the property and it was not just a single-family home. Rosana rented out three efficiency apartments at the back of the residence. Rosana told Agent Valencia that Schmitz lived in an apartment at “the north side of the residence.” The officers “went to the secondary door on the north side” and discovered another family. When the officers started searching there, they asked if Schmitz was a resident. The family “said no and pointed towards another door on the north side.”
Agent Valencia and the other officers went to the next apartment. Valencia discovered one of the keys seized from Schmitz opened the door. The officers entered and found several guns. Schmitz was indicted for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number.
Schmitz asked the trial court to suppress the guns and drugs found in the apartment, claiming the search warrant was defective because it described a single-family home (rather than his specific apartment) as the premises to be searched. The court denied his motion. Schmitz appealed.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and most state constitutions require that the place to be searched pursuant to a warrant be particularly described in the affidavit. “The purpose of the particularity requirement is not limited to the prevention of general searches,” the Supreme Court noted. A particular warrant also “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search” Groh v. Ramirez (540 U.S. 551 (2004)).
Agent Valencia testified he had searched property records and found county data indicated the residence “was a one single-family home.” Agent Valencia also described surveilling 4279 Violet Circle at least once per week over several months. The officers could only see the roadway, driveway, and grassy area in front of the main residence. For the obvious reason of avoiding detection of their surveillance, they never watched 4279 Violet Circle from the rear. Agent Valencia testified he believed “several people” resided at 4279 Violet Circle because there were “a lot of vehicles in the residence,” but he was never able to see people enter the residence from his vantage points. He saw Schmitz arrive and leave, but he never saw Schmitz actually enter the residence. Valencia also noted the property had just one trash can.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating: “Valencia and his team did not see any physical signs of multiple units because none existed. The house had just one mailbox, just one address, just one garbage can, and no exterior markings delineating the apartments.” Acknowledging the residence had been subdivided into several individual dwellings, the court held, “this ex post facto discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant.”
When an officer objectively and reasonably relies on a search warrant, the evidence will be admitted despite the warrant’s failings (United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). The court concluded: “the record reflects that officers reasonably believed, based on a reasonable investigation, that the residence was a single-family home when they sought the first search warrant. Accordingly, the warrant was valid.”
