Booth v. Lazzara, 2026 WL 102915 (6th Cir. 2026)
With increasing frequency, police work intersects with mental health crisis response. That intersection has produced a recurring claim in lawsuits against officers and agencies: that officers violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by failing to “accommodate” a person’s mental illness during a detention. The Booth opinion is a classic case study in how quickly a family request for help can turn into an armed confrontation.
In early 2022, Dustin Booth — who had never exhibited signs of or been treated for mental illness — began displaying escalating manic and delusional behavior. His wife repeatedly sought intervention from the Monroe (Ohio) Police Department and relayed worries that he could be a danger to himself or others, including concerns about access to firearms.
Booth’s erratic behavior worsened over a stretch of several days. Eventually he barricaded himself in his home. During the ensuing standoff, he appeared at the door holding a revolver and made disturbing statements involving his wife and children. Shirtless, he had apparently “written all over [himself] with a marker.” Officers chose to pull back to de-escalate, leaving detectives in an unmarked car and planning to detain him for hospitalization if he left.
One of Booth’s closest friends heard about the situation and visited the home. After the two ate some pizza together, Booth decided to leave his house in his friend’s truck. He insisted on taking the revolver.
Soon after, officers stopped the truck to take Booth to the hospital. Booth reached for the gun, struggling with his friend. Once again in control of the revolver, he got out of the truck and walked toward a busy intersection and open businesses. When Booth ignored commands from law enforcement officers, a police service dog handler released his dog. The dog did not engage Booth and the handler then went hands-on. Breaking away, Booth brandished the revolver at the officers, who shot him. Booth later died.
“De-escalation is not an ADA trump card that overrides the objective realities of public safety.”
Booth’s wife sued. Curiously, she did not challenge the ultimate lethal force. Instead, she challenged the lead-up decisions: alleged failure to provide ADA accommodation, the stop itself, and the nonlethal force used before Booth displayed the gun.
Title II of the ADA provides that a qualified person with a disability may not be excluded from services or otherwise discriminated against by a public entity. Courts recognize two general theories under the ADA: intentional discrimination and (in appropriate cases) a duty to make reasonable accommodations. In her case, Booth’s wife focused on a reasonable accommodation claim. The proposed “accommodation” was essentially to de-escalate and avoid allegedly aggressive tactics during the detention.
The appellate court held an accommodation is not “reasonable” if it requires more than a moderate modification or would fundamentally alter the activity. In the context of an arrest, courts have repeatedly held officers are not required to adjust procedures when doing so would create safety concerns. In this case, the appellate court concluded the officers faced “exigent circumstances,” citing the officers’ earlier decisions rejecting “de-escalation as accommodation” where the subject posed a continuing threat. The court saw Booth as an objectively armed, unstable subject who had refused engagement, barricaded, staged weapons in the home, insisted on leaving with a firearm, and moved into a public setting. Considering those facts, the officers did not have to deviate from their usual high-risk procedures to accommodate Booth’s disability.
The ADA does not require officers to take additional risks. When a subject objectively poses a safety threat to officers or the public, accommodations that would require slower, softer, or less controlled tactics can be deemed unreasonable as a matter of law. That does not mean de-escalation is irrelevant. Rather, it means de-escalation is not an ADA trump card that overrides the objective realities of public safety.
Turning to the Fourth Amendment claims, the court stated the same safety facts mattered. The stop was not a traffic stop, according to the court, but a seizure to take Booth for mental health treatment. Officers may make such a seizure when they have probable cause the person poses a danger to himself or others. The court found probable cause to seize Booth based on the same objective risk factors that defeated the ADA claim.
A common litigation move is to reframe cases like these as “minor crimes” or pretext stops. The court rejected that framing, noting the stop’s purpose was hospitalization and that officer motives do not control the objective probable cause analysis.
The court evaluated the nonlethal force under a mental health rubric. While force claims use the familiar totality-of-circumstances lens, the opinion points out that mental health seizures are not evaluated with the same “severity of crime” emphasis that fits criminal arrests. In this setting, the question becomes whether the subject’s condition created danger and whether the force was reasonably necessary to eliminate that danger.
On the ground, the police service dog handler had information and observations supporting an immediate threat: a struggle over a gun in the vehicle, a report that Booth had a gun (and possibly had assaulted his friend), noncompliance with lawful commands, and movement toward open businesses and a busy intersection. The court held deploying the dog and then attempting a takedown when the dog failed were reasonable responses in a rapidly evolving scene.
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There are several lessons for officers facing similar mental health calls:
- ADA “accommodation” is not a requirement to delay when the subject is armed or credibly dangerous. If the subject’s behavior and access to weapons create an objective threat, the ADA does not require officers to soften tactics in ways that would increase risk to officers or bystanders. The court treated public safety as a fundamental component of the activity.
- De-escalation is good practice, but it is not always a legal duty. The officers dealing with Booth actually de-escalated earlier by pulling back from the house and avoiding a forced entry. The ADA claim focused on the later detention attempt during a high-risk stop. Once the situation moved into a public space with an armed subject, the court refused to impose de-escalation as a required accommodation.
- Treat these as “mental health seizures” when that is what they are. If you are detaining for the purpose of hospitalization, document the facts that establish probable cause of danger to self or others: family statements, threats, barricade behavior, refusal to engage, access to weapons, refusal to disarm, movement toward the public, and any struggle for weapons. In this case, the court’s approval of the stop turned on that objective record.
- When force is used, articulate the danger you were addressing at the time you decide to use force. The court’s force analysis focused on what the officer knew and saw immediately before deploying the dog and going hands-on. Articulation matters most when the scene is chaotic and fast.
Booth teaches that the ADA can require reasonable modifications in some government services. But it does not require officers to gamble with safety in the face of an armed, objectively dangerous subject having a health crisis. In that setting, both the ADA and the Fourth Amendment analysis are anchored to the same reality: the risk the subject poses to officers, bystanders, and himself. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment for officers and the city.
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