In recent days, a fatal shooting in Minneapolis, Minnesota, involving an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent and a woman driving a vehicle has ignited intense national debate. Activists, pundits, reporters, politicians, and armchair quarterbacks across the country have felt the need to weigh in on the matter. Many have taken to dissecting the incident frame by frame, analyzing multiple camera angles, and offering confident conclusions about what the officer (and/or the woman) should or should not have done.
As is often the case in high-profile use-of-force incidents (particularly those involving vehicles) public commentary has outpaced the investigative process.
The shooting is now in the hands of federal investigators, who will ultimately determine the legality of both the woman’s actions and the ICE agent’s response. Those conclusions will depend on facts that are still being gathered, evaluated, and tested against constitutional standards, federal policy, and applicable law. Until that process is complete, definitive conclusions — either condemning or justifying the shooting — are premature.
What is already clear, however, is that much of the public discussion surrounding this case reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal, policy, and tactical realities governing law enforcement use of deadly force in vehicle encounters. Many of the loudest voices commenting on the incident appear unfamiliar with how courts evaluate these encounters, how modern law enforcement policies address them, and why many agencies across the country have dramatically narrowed the scope of when officers may reasonably fire at moving vehicles.
“Cops and Cars”
Lexipol recently produced a two-part webinar series titled “Cops and Cars” that examined this complex topic. The panelists explored the legal framework governing use of force involving vehicles, the human factors that influence officer decision-making in fast-moving encounters, and the practical and moral obligations agencies and officers carry when confronting vehicular threats.
To be clear, the webinars — and the takeaways that follow — are explicitly not a commentary on the Minneapolis case, nor an attempt to judge the actions of the individuals involved. Instead, the material from “Cops and Cars” provides a broader framework for understanding why shootings involving vehicles are among the most legally perilous and operationally complex situations officers can face. That framework can help inform law enforcement professionals who are watching this case unfold and asking an important question: When, if ever, is deadly force against a driver justified, and why do courts so often scrutinize these cases differently?
The discussion below draws on those principles to clarify the law and the risks and the responsibilities that come with using deadly force in vehicle-related encounters — regardless of how any single case is ultimately resolved.
The Totality of the Circumstances Still Rules
In cases involving law enforcement, vehicles, and use of force, the legal lens is almost always Graham v. Connor. Under this framework, actions are judged based on the totality of circumstances, and not just the split-second moment in which force is used.
Courts evaluate vehicle-related shootings under Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” standards (Graham v. Connor). Rather than zooming in on the exact moment of the deadly force, they look at the totality of the circumstances, including events leading up to the shooting — and not just the final instant. That “lead-up matters” point is a core message of the webinars and was recently reinforced by the Supreme Court in Barnes v. Felix.
Here are the three “Graham factors” that help to inform the analysis of all the facts and circumstances when evaluating a situation in which deadly force is used:
- What was the severity of the crime the officer believed the suspect to have committed or to be committing?
- Did the suspect present an immediate threat to the safety of officers or the public?
- Was the suspect actively resisting arrest or attempting to escape?
Takeaway: If an officer’s tactics or positioning unnecessarily compress time and space — such as stepping into the vehicle’s path, or otherwise limiting their own ability to move — those decisions may factor into how a court evaluates the reasonableness of any subsequent use of force. Even when a driver’s conduct is unlawful, courts may consider whether the officer’s pre-shooting actions contributed to the perceived need for deadly force.
There’s Usually (but Not Always) a Better Option
For a variety of reasons, it’s best to avoid shooting at a moving vehicle. The main exception, of course, is when there’s an imminent threat to offices or bystanders that can’t be avoided.
Shooting at or into a moving vehicle is one of the most heavily scrutinized uses of force an officer can make, and the event will inevitably be examined in great detail long after the incident. Courts, juries, investigators and policymakers will parse every element of the encounter to determine whether the use of deadly force was justified under constitutional standards and applicable policy.
Because of that, it is critically important officers and agencies do everything possible to prevent situations where shooting at a vehicle becomes the only option. Modern guidance, including Lexipol’s policies and training, reflects this reality by limiting shooting at or into moving vehicles to only when deadly force is necessary to stop an imminent threat that cannot otherwise be avoided.
Takeaway: Officers should first seek to get out of harm’s way (reposition, use cover, or otherwise create distance and time) rather than firing at a vehicle. In most cases, the safest tactical choice is to avoid the vehicle’s path and manage the encounter from a position where deadly force is not the only apparent option. Obviously, this isn’t always possible in a real-world scenario.
When Deadly Force and Vehicle Dynamics Collide
Even when deadly force is justified, moving vehicles pose extra hazards that increase liability exposure and the likelihood of further harm.
Use of force never happens in a vacuum, and this is especially true when vehicles are involved. As Lexipol co-founder Gordon Graham notes in his Today’s Tip on the topic: “What about bystanders? Collateral damage? Uninvolved passengers? And what happens if the shot is effective? Will we be left with an out-of-control vehicle careening down the road?”
Vehicle shootings create a number of foreseeable risks:
- Rounds missing, ricocheting, or over penetrating in public spaces.
- Unintended passengers being hit.
- Loss of vehicle control after the driver is shot.
- Secondary crashes and bystander injuries.
Takeaway: This is why agencies (and juries) often view discharging a firearm at a moving car as high-risk even when the suspect is provably dangerous — and why many agencies’ policies restrict it to situations in which officers have no other reasonable option.
Fleeing Isn’t the Same as Threatening
Courts draw a distinction between (a) deadly force to end a dangerous chase or threat and (b) shooting at a car that is merely fleeing.
There are several important cases to consider when discussing the difference between fleeing and threatening:
- Scott v. Harris: The use of deadly force against a moving vehicle (in this case, ramming or “PITting” a car) can be reasonable to end a dangerous chase that threatens public safety.
- Plumhoff v. Rickard: The use of deadly force during or after a chase was upheld where the driver posed a grave threat to public safety. The court also noted officers need not stop firing until the threat ends.
- Sacramento v. Lewis: Cases involving injury or death (even accidental harm) have a very high “shocks the conscience” bar under the principle of due process.
The phrase “shock the conscience” comes from Rochin v. California, in which the Court considered whether police conduct violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (In that case, officers forcibly pumped a man’s stomach after he swallowed evidence.) Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter said, “This is conduct that shocks the conscience and offends even hardened sensibilities. … It is bound to shock the conscience and offend a sense of justice.”
Takeaway: A car that is simply fleeing is not automatically a lawful target. The critical question is always the immediacy and severity of the threat to officers and others.
Immediacy and the High Bar for Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity often turns on whether the threat was immediate and whether the law was “clearly established.”
Qualified immunity shields law enforcement officers (and other government officials) from civil lawsuits unless their conduct violates a “clearly established” statutory or constitutional right. This legal standard requires sufficient clarity on “established law” to allow a reasonable officer to understand a specific action was unlawful in that particular situation.
When a suspect uses a vehicle as a weapon, courts may find qualified immunity, as they did in Tousis v. Billiot, which Lexipol’s Chief (Ret.) Ken Wallentine has discussed in detail. In contrast, for cases where the facts suggest the officer fired into a car absent an immediate deadly threat, qualified immunity can be denied (as in Estate of Christopher J. Davis v. Ortiz, which Chief Wallentine has also covered in detail).
Takeaway: Vehicle shooting investigations are heavily fact-dependent. The closer it looks to “shooting at a departing threat” rather than “stopping an imminent lethal threat,” the less likely courts are to award qualified immunity. But in a qualified immunity case, this analysis focuses on the reasonable perception of the officer. Did this officer — under a set of specific and unique circumstances — reasonably perceive and react to what they perceived as a lethal threat?
Tactics Matter Long Before the Trigger Pull
“Officer-created jeopardy” may not be a formal doctrine endorsed by the Supreme Court, but tactics still matter in the analyzing the totality of the circumstances.
Although the Supreme Court has not adopted an “officer-created jeopardy” doctrine, courts continue to examine officer tactics and positioning when examining the totality of circumstances surrounding use-of-force cases. The underlying concept, that an officer’s pre-force decisions can shape the reasonableness inquiry, remains very much a factor.
Recent federal appellate decisions underscore this point. In Flores v. Henderson (analyzed here), the court reaffirmed that an officer’s tactical choices leading up to use of force may be relevant to whether that force was objectively reasonable. Similarly, in Rakes v. Roederer (analyzed here), the court allowed claims to proceed where officers were alleged to have affirmatively placed themselves in danger through avoidable actions, reinforcing that courts will scrutinize how an encounter unfolded — and not just how it ended.
While courts may avoid the phrase “officer-created jeopardy,” they do not ignore the practical realities of how officers arrive at moments of perceived necessity.
Takeaway: Even without an explicitly named “officer-created jeopardy” doctrine, avoidable positioning and tactical choices may weigh heavily in determining whether an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable. Thoughtful tactics and deliberate positioning early in an encounter can reduce both the need for deadly force and the legal risk that follows.
Reasonable Belief at the Moment of Force
Ultimately, any deadly force analysis turns on a single, controlling question: Did the officer reasonably believe, at the moment force was used, they faced an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm? Under the Fourth Amendment, courts do not (or at least should not) evaluate use-of-force decisions in hindsight. Instead, they’re charged with assessing whether the officer’s perception of danger was objectively reasonable given the facts known at that moment.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized this standard. Going back to Graham v. Connor, the Court said law enforcement actions must be judged “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” accounting for the fact that officers often make split-second decisions in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court confirmed deadly force may be used only where the officer has reasonable justification to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.
Takeaway: Regardless of tactics, policy violations, or disputed facts leading up to an encounter, courts will ultimately ask whether a reasonable officer in the same position would have believed deadly force was necessary to stop an imminent threat of death or grievous bodily harm at the instant the trigger was pulled.
What Officers and Agencies Can Learn from “Cops and Cars”
The “Cops and Cars” webinar series underscores a reality law enforcement leaders already understand: When an officer discharges a firearm at a driver or vehicle, the consequences extend far beyond the moment itself. Such incidents routinely trigger criminal investigations, civil litigation, internal review, and intense public scrutiny. Even when officers are ultimately cleared, the professional, personal, and organizational impacts can be lasting.
A central focus of “Cops and Cars” is the role of human factors in vehicle-related encounters. These include reaction time, tunnel vision, perceptual distortion, and automatic responses under stress. These factors explain why officers may default to deeply ingrained habits when time and space collapse. Because of this, training must intentionally reshape those defaults.
When officers are trained primarily in static environments, they may instinctively equate threat with the need to shoot, even when safer alternatives exist. By contrast, training that emphasizes movement, distance, and cover can help officers instinctively seek options that reduce risk. When that mindset becomes automatic, deadly force is more likely to remain a rare exception rather than a reflexive response.
The moral and professional framework reinforced in “Cops and Cars” is consistent and pragmatic: Prioritize the preservation of life, recognize that disengagement is often a sound tactical choice, and invest in policies and training designed to prevent predictable tragedies — before they reach the point where force becomes the only perceived option.
Watch the “Cops and Cars” webinars now:
Part 1: Cops and Cars: Changing the Training Paradigm
Part 2: Cops and Cars: Managing Risk Through Behavior-Based Supervision
- Webinars
