Cameron v. City of Des Moines, 2026 WL 535206 (8th Cir. 2026)
Police dog cases often turn on timing. Not just how long the bite lasted, but what happened before the dog was released.
In Cameron v. City of Des Moines, the appellate court held a jury could find excessive force when an officer released a police service dog on a fleeing murder suspect without first giving a warning and an opportunity to surrender. But the same court also held the officers were not liable for failing to intervene, and that the dog’s approximately 15-second hold until handcuffing did not violate clearly established law. That split result is what makes this case useful to officers — particularly to K9 handlers.
In 2022 in Des Moines, Iowa, police officers were trying to arrest Tyrone Cameron on a warrant for first-degree murder. Since Cameron had outstanding warrants and a history of violence, officers believed he was dangerous. They surrounded the house where he had been hiding, hoping to arrest him. Among them was Officer Daobandon Meunsaveng, accompanied by Bero, his police service dog.
Officer Meunsaveng spotted Cameron on the roof trying to escape. Cameron jumped off the roof, landed, and ran. At that point, Officer Meunsaveng released Bero. He did not give a warning before sending the dog to apprehend Cameron. As Bero ran toward Cameron, Officer Meunsaveng commanded Bero to apprehend by biting. About five seconds later, the dog caught Cameron, who had stumbled and fallen. Bero held the suspect while officers moved in to handcuff him. Once Cameron was cuffed, the officer used a bite stick and the dog’s collar to remove Bero. The entire bite lasted about 15 seconds.
“The question was whether giving a warning would have been unsafe or impractical.”
Cameron sued, claiming excessive force, failure to intervene, and failure to train. The 8th Circuit reiterated that in K9 cases, the presence or absence of a warning is a critical fact. Under prior 8th Circuit law, officers are generally required to give a warning and an opportunity for peaceful surrender before deploying a police dog, except a rare situation where a warning is not feasible. The court accepted that Cameron could reasonably be viewed as dangerous. After all, he was wanted for murder, had a violent history, and was trying to flee. But that did not answer the real question. The question was not whether Cameron was dangerous. The question was whether giving a warning would have been unsafe or impractical.
On that point, the defendants came up short. The court said they had not explained why a warning would have created additional danger. In fact, the court noted such warnings often reduce confrontation by increasing the chance of surrender. On these facts, the court held a jury could find the failure to warn violated clearly established law. Because of this, the claim of excessive force, based on failure to warn, survived.
But Cameron lost on the rest of his claims. The appellate court held it was reasonable for Officer Meunsaveng to let Bero maintain the bite until Cameron was handcuffed. That part matters because officers sometimes assume that once the dog is engaged, every second afterward becomes a constitutional problem. Not so. The 8th Circuit looked at the totality of the circumstances: Cameron was wanted for a violent homicide, had been actively fleeing moments earlier, was believed to be armed and dangerous, and in fact was later discovered to have a knife in his pocket. Even though Cameron was on the ground and not reaching for a weapon while the dog held him, the court said a reasonable officer could view that “surrender” as temporary or tactical until the dog was removed. Under those facts, keeping the dog engaged until handcuffing was not unreasonable.
The court also rejected the claim based on Officer Meunsaveng’s technique for removing the dog. Cameron argued that using a bite breaker bar and physically lifting the dog was excessive (versus verbal commands). But the court did not even have to decide whether the technique was reasonable, because there was no clearly established law telling officers this particular removal method was unconstitutional. Qualified immunity applied.
Then came the duty-to-intervene claim. Cameron argued other officers should have stepped in, either by giving a warning after Bero was released or by telling Officer Meunsaveng to remove the dog sooner. The 8th Circuit rejected both theories.
As to the warning, the problem was simple: By the time the other officers could have spoken up, the alleged constitutional harm had already happened. The alleged excessive force was the release of the dog without a prior warning and opportunity to surrender. A warning shouted after the dog was already running toward Cameron would not have prevented that harm. So, there was no viable failure-to-intervene claim on that point.
As to the duration of the bite, the court had already decided allowing Bero to hold Cameron until handcuffing did not violate clearly established law. And if the underlying force is not clearly unconstitutional, other officers do not have a duty to intervene to stop it. That is the practical application of this case. It separates pre-deployment decisions from post-contact control.
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Here are some key takeaways for officers:
- A K9 warning is not a formality. In the 8th Circuit, it is a major constitutional fact. If feasible, officers should give a clear warning and a real opportunity to surrender before releasing a bite-and-hold dog.
- Danger alone does not automatically excuse the warning. A suspect may be dangerous, wanted for a violent crime, and actively fleeing. That still does not answer whether a warning was feasible.
- Once the dog is lawfully engaged, a brief hold until handcuffing may still be reasonable. The court upheld a roughly 15-second bite under these facts because the suspect had just fled, was believed to be armed, and was not yet secured.
- Failure to intervene depends on timing and on the clarity of the underlying violation. If the alleged violation is complete before another officer has a meaningful chance to stop it, there may be no intervention liability. And officers have no duty to stop force that is not clearly unlawful.
The bottom line is this: Cameron absolutely does not say officers cannot use a police dog on a violent fleeing suspect. It says that if a warning is feasible, skipping it can be a constitutional problem. The bite itself may be justified, but the missing warning may not be.
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