United States v. Glover, 2025 WL 2045751 (D.C. Cir 2025)
Officers from Washington, D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department went to DaKnea Brewer’s home looking for her two brothers, for whom they had arrest warrants. When Brewer answered the door, Officer Eldrick Creamer told her he needed to talk to her about something “important” concerning her brothers. He also said they shouldn’t talk out in the hallway where everyone could hear their business. Officer Creamer then asked, “I hope you don’t mind, may I please come in?”
Brewer swung the door open and Officer Creamer walked inside, followed by several other officers.
Inside the residence, Creamer apologized for waking up Brewer, then asked whether her brothers lived in the apartment and happened to be home. Brewer said no. She told Officer Creamer there were other people in the apartment, but not her brothers. Creamer told Brewer, “Okay, well listen, I have got warrants.” He told Brewer the officers “needed to visually see” whether her brothers were in her apartment and then they would leave. Brewer answered, “All right, that is fine.”
In another room, an officer found Anthony Glover sleeping with a gun near him. The officers determined Glover was a felon and arrested him for possession of a firearm by a felon. Glover asked the trial court to suppress the gun, claiming the search of the apartment was illegal.
During a suppression hearing, Officer Creamer testified he did not have a search warrant, and that he told Brewer he had “warrants” without clarifying whether he had “a search warrant or an arrest warrant.” He also acknowledged he did not tell Brewer he wanted to search the apartment, rather, he said that he “needed to go through the apartment.”
The court found Brewer’s consent to the search was voluntary, citing Officer Creamer’s polite and non-threatening demeanor. The trial court also concluded Brewer understood Creamer’s mention of “warrants” to mean arrest warrants and not search warrants. The court denied Glover’s motion to suppress the evidence.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding the trial judge did not adequately weigh whether Officer Creamer’s statements about having “warrants” and needing to search the apartment rendered Brewer’s consent mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. In Bumper v. North Carolina (391 U.S. 543 (1968)), the Supreme Court held that a court examining the voluntariness of consent must consider whether it was coerced by a claim of lawful authority.
The appellate court stated Officer Creamer had not made any false claim of authority to search. Nor did he display his badge or gun or otherwise make any claim of legal authority to enter Brewer’s apartment. In most cases, the Bumper decision applies to situations where officers affirmatively misrepresent the existence of a warrant. In this case, however, the appellate court applied the standard to be whether Officer Creamer’s reference to “warrants” was a claim of lawful authority to carry out the search, which influenced Brewer’s understanding of whether she could refuse to allow it.
Though the officer in this case talked nice and thought he was obtaining voluntary consent, the better path would have been to make it clear the “warrants” were arrest warrants. Officer Creamer did inquire whether Brewer’s brothers resided in the apartment. If it had been their residence and there was reason to believe they were home, the situation would have been quite different.
The Supreme Court has ruled a valid felony arrest warrant carries the authority to forcibly enter a suspect’s home when an officer has a reasonable belief the dwelling is actually the suspect’s residence and the suspect is present (Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). This rule does not apply to common areas in an apartment or condominium complex. The plain language of the Payton decision addresses the officer’s right to enter a suspect’s home by force with a valid felony arrest warrant. A few courts have invalidated forced entry into a suspect’s home to arrest a suspect on a misdemeanor warrant. However, the prevailing interpretation of the Payton case is that there is no distinction between felony and misdemeanor arrest warrants for purposes of authorizing entry into a suspect’s home.
A note of caution, however: Most courts view misdemeanor offenses with greater scrutiny when they balance the constitutional interests of law enforcement and the Fourth Amendment protection given to a person in a home.
